Remote Service Sessions¶

A remote session lets one machine do the hard, service-specific work (authenticating to a streaming service, listing titles, resolving tracks and manifests, and, optionally, DRM licensing) while another machine runs the actual download, decryption, and muxing locally.

This is the mechanism behind unshackle's client/server "remote download" workflow. A thin local client (RemoteService) talks to an unshackle serve instance over HTTP. The server keeps an authenticated service instance alive between requests so the client can authenticate once and then make many follow-up calls against the same remote session.

Why you'd use this

The server has service accounts, cookies, or a CDM you do not want to copy to every machine.
You want to do downloads on a fast/local machine but keep credentials and licensing centralised.
A service is region-locked to where the server lives, and the client is not.

The big picture¶

┌──────────────────────────┐        HTTP (X-Secret-Key)         ┌──────────────────────────┐
│  Local machine (client)  │  ───────────────────────────────▶ │   unshackle serve        │
│                          │                                    │                          │
│  unshackle dl --server   │   POST /api/session/create         │  authenticated Service   │
│                          │   GET  /api/session/{id}/titles    │  instance, kept alive in │
│  • track selection       │   POST /api/session/{id}/tracks    │  an in-memory session    │
│  • download / decrypt    │   POST /api/session/{id}/segments  │  store (TTL-based)       │
│  • mux                   │   POST /api/session/{id}/license   │                          │
│                          │   DELETE /api/session/{id}         │                          │
└──────────────────────────┘                                    └──────────────────────────┘

The client implements the same interface dl expects from a normal service, but every service-facing method proxies to the server. Everything after track selection (downloading segments, decrypting, and muxing) runs locally.

Migration: remote_dl is gone

The RemoteService adapter lives inside the ordinary dl command and replaces the old standalone remote_dl command. If you have prior scripts or docs that invoke remote_dl, use dl with a configured remote server instead. The functionality now rides on dl through RemoteService.

For the auth-facing endpoints, header format, and error shapes referenced below, see Authentication and the endpoint reference in the REST API index.

Configuring a remote server (client side)¶

On the client, add a remote_services block to your unshackle.yaml. Each entry names a server and provides its URL and API key.

unshackle.yaml (client)

remote_services:
  my_server:
    url: "https://my-box.example:8786"
    api_key: "your-api-key"
    # Optional: let the server's CDM do the licensing instead of a local CDM
    server_cdm: false
    # Optional: per-service config overrides applied locally (title_map, cdm, etc.)
    services:
      EXAMPLE:
        title_map:
          "0ABCDEF": "The Show (Renamed Locally)"

Key	Required	Meaning
`url`	yes	Base URL of the `unshackle serve` instance (no trailing slash needed)
`api_key`	no	Sent as the `X-Secret-Key` header on every request
`server_cdm`	no	When `true`, DRM keys are resolved by the server's CDM rather than a local device (default `false`)
`services`	no	Per-service local config overrides, keyed by service tag

Port default

The unshackle serve default port is 8786 (not 8080). Use the port your server binds. Some older example snippets show 8080, which is not the default.

Selecting a server¶

If you configure exactly one server, unshackle uses it implicitly:

unshackle dl EXAMPLE 0ABCDEF

If you configure more than one server, you must pick one with --server:

unshackle dl --server my_server EXAMPLE 0ABCDEF

With no remote_services configured at all, unshackle raises a clear error telling you to add the block shown above.

What happens during a download¶

From your point of view the command looks like an ordinary download. Under the hood the client walks a remote session through its lifecycle.

1. Create + authenticate2. Interactive prompts (if needed)3. Titles + tracks4. Licensing5. Download + close

The client calls POST /api/session/create, forwarding whatever it can so the server does not have to prompt:

Local credentials for the service/profile ({username, password, extra?})
Local cookies, compressed and base64-encoded
A resolved proxy, or, if you did not set one, your detected client region. A client that reports no region is not blocked. The proxy must be a full proxy URI unless the operator gives your API key server_proxy. Without server_proxy the server does not resolve country codes with its own proxy providers, and it rejects the remote session when it sits in a different region from the reported one, asking the client to pass --proxy with its own proxy, or --no-proxy to accept the server's own connection. With server_proxy the server picks a proxy that matches the client region itself. For --proxy controld:ca the client points its Control D profile at the region and sends only the resolver, as controld://<resolver>@dns.controld.com. The server counts it as a full proxy URI and runs its own forwarder for it. A bare region skips Control D, because its proxy is a forwarder on the client. See Control D The client also downloads playlists and segments through the same proxy, as a local run does. --no-proxy-download and --proxy-download change that for downloads only.
Track-selection hints (range_, vcodec, quality, best_available) so the server fetches the right manifests
Your language and audio codec selection (-l, -vl, -al, -a, -fs) in a dl_params object. Some services fetch one manifest for each audio language, and pick the languages from these values
Your local per-service cache files (e.g. refreshed tokens), including files in subdirectories of the service cache directory, but only the files for the active profile. The client withholds a file whose path, in any directory or file name, embeds a hash of another credential or the name of another profile. One profile's tokens therefore never reach the server while you use a different profile. At worst, a withheld file makes the server authenticate again

The server uses its own accounts only when the operator lists the service in serve.server_accounts and gives your API key server_accounts in serve.users. For any other service, a client that sends no credentials or cookies authenticates with nothing. For a listed service the client sends no credentials, cookies, or cache at all: the server picks one of its own accounts that works in your region and rotates through them. --proxy ca picks a ca account.

GET /api/services advertises the regions those accounts cover. When your own region is not one of them and you set no --proxy, the client resolves a proxy for the first advertised region itself, so both sides sit in a region the account works in. This is a bare region query, so it skips Control D. A server-account service does not accept a controld:// resolver from the client.

The server responds immediately with a session ID and a status. Authentication runs in the background on the server.

Some services need a one-time code, PIN, or device confirmation. When the server's auth flow asks for input, the remote session enters pending_input. The client polls, displays the prompt to you locally, collects your answer, and sends it back. The server's auth thread resumes with your response.

Enter the 6-digit code sent to your email: 483920

A client older than the service_params change sends service options as flat body keys only. A flat key that shares a name with a transport field (such as profile, which at the top level always means the credentials profile) no longer reaches the service; the server logs a warning naming the dropped key. Update the client to send service options under service_params.

The server also mirrors the service's own log output (self.log) into a per-session buffer. The client drains it through GET /api/session/{id}/logs after each step and prints the records locally, so you see the server-side reason when a step fails.

Once authenticated, the client fetches the title list, then the tracks for the chosen title. The tracks come back with playback URLs, and the server ships DASH/ISM manifests as compressed XML so the client can re-parse them locally for downloading. A service can build an AdaptationSet of its own that the served manifest does not contain. Each such track gets a one-AdaptationSet MPD in track_manifests, and the client re-parses that instead. Any session_headers / session_cookies the server used are merged into the client's local HTTP session.

The tracks response repeats the title. A service can rewrite title fields inside get_tracks, so the client takes this copy in place of the one from the title list. Each track carries the full local field set. After the manifest re-parse the client overlays the JSON-safe part of the service-set track.data, so a service value wins over the parser's. An attachment that the service wrote to a file on the server travels as base64, and the client writes it to its own temp directory.

For a DRM-protected title the client either proxies its CDM challenge through the server, or, if server_cdm: true, asks the server to do the full CDM flow and return the content keys directly. See Server-side vs. proxied CDM below.

The client downloads, decrypts, and muxes locally. While it works, it sends a keep-alive request to the remote session at an interval of one third of session_ttl, so a long download does not let the remote session expire. On completion, and also when dl exits early (--list, Ctrl+C, an error), it deletes the remote session. If the login belongs to the client, the DELETE request returns the updated cache files (for example a refreshed token) and the client saves them locally, so the next remote session can skip interactive authentication. The login belongs to the client when it succeeds and the remote session does not use a server account. This includes a pair code that the user approves on another device. A server-account login never does, and neither does a remote session on the server's device (see below). The client saves only the returned files that pass the same profile check it applies before it sends them, so a file for another profile cannot overwrite that profile's local file.

Renaming remote titles locally

You can rename titles for a remote service you do not have installed locally by adding a title_map under that service in your client remote_services.<name>.services config. The server sends raw titles. Your local map wins.

This is deliberate: the server does no title_map remapping of its own and sends titles exactly as the service returns them. All remapping happens on the client, applied to the titles the server sends back. It keeps the final output name fully under the client's control and lets you rename titles even for services you have no local install of.

Server-side vs. proxied CDM¶

There are two ways DRM keys get resolved, chosen by the client's server_cdm flag.

Proxied CDM (default)Server-side CDM (server_cdm: true)

Your local CDM builds the license challenge. The client sends that challenge to POST /api/session/{id}/license, the server forwards it to the service, and the raw license bytes come back for your local CDM to parse.

Keeps your CDM local. The server only relays the license request.
Used when server_cdm is false (the default).
Also used for a run with dl --cdm <name>, and for a service whose own entry in your cdm config named the loaded device. In each case the client sends server_cdm: false when it creates the remote session, and the server builds the service on your device even when the API key has the server CDM.
A service option that the service lists in SERVER_DEVICE_OPTIONS keeps the server CDM. The server reads the option from service_params, then from the top level of the request. The create response gives the result in server_cdm, and the client shows a warning when the server did not apply its choice.
The service on the server sees your device, not the server's: its DRM system, security level, system ID and device type. A CDM call that the service makes (for example a session-key exchange at login) goes to your client as a cdm_call, and your local CDM answers it. See Your own device identity.

The server's CDM does everything. The client sends track IDs (or a PSSH), the server checks its key vaults, loads the device configured for your API key, runs the CDM flow, and returns KID:KEY pairs directly. The client needs no CDM.

Enable with server_cdm: true in the server entry.
The server tells the client which DRM type it used (widevine or playready).
A content key the server took from its own vault is unproven. The response lists its KID in vault_keys, the client decrypts and checks that the output decodes, and a wrong pair goes back to POST /api/session/{id}/keys/bad. The server flags the pair in every local vault it holds, reports it to the vault that served it, and the next licence for that KID skips the pair and reaches the CDM. A server with no local SQLite vault cannot store the flag. The server accepts a report only for a pair it served to that remote session. The client never learns the server vault names.
A content key in the client's own vaults goes first, even when the server already answered. The client proves it, and a server key waits as the next candidate.

A height limit on the server CDM

An API key with server_cdm_max_height gets the server CDM only up to that height. The session create response tells the client who licenses the session in server_cdm and gives the limit in server_cdm_max_height. In a server CDM session, the batch licence response lists each track the server refused to license live under capped_tracks. A single-track server CDM licence answers 403 SERVER_CDM_CAPPED for such a track. In both cases the client licenses those tracks in proxy mode with its own local CDM. See server_cdm_max_height.

Your own device identity¶

A service can need more than a licence challenge from your device: an ESN, model keys, or a session-key exchange that runs on the CDM. The device never leaves your machine. Only these cross the wire:

Device facts. When it creates the remote session, the client sends its DRM system, security level, system ID and device type. The service sees a stand-in with these facts.
CDM calls. When the service calls the CDM, the server sends a cdm_call to the client and waits. The client makes the challenge, or parses the licence, on its own CDM. When the service closes a CDM session, the server sends a close call, because a CDM holds only a few sessions. The client polls for calls during login and while one of its own requests runs service code, so an idle remote session sends nothing extra.
Session keys only. A keys call returns Widevine OPERATOR_SESSION and SIGNING keys. It never returns a content key, and the client refuses a PlayReady keys call. So a server cannot use your device to license titles for itself.
Identity config. A service names the config keys a client may send (for example esn, Kpe, Kph, esn_map). The server lists them in the service listing as client_config. The client sends only those keys, from its own services: <TAG>: block in unshackle.yaml. When the client sends an identity, the server drops its own value for each of those keys, so the two identities never mix. A mapping (such as esn_map) merges the client's entries over the server's. A client entry replaces a server entry with the same key, also when the server's key is a number. The server keeps these values in the remote session's memory only.

A service can also offer an option that builds the remote session on the server's own device and identity, for the quality that device reaches. The session then makes no live licence at all: each content key comes from the server vault or the client's own vaults, and a content key that no vault holds stops the download with an error. The create response sets server_device to true for such a remote session. The service then uses the server's own config: the client's identity values do not apply. The client reads the server vault only when the API key has the server_vault grant (or server_cdm); without it, the client reads only its own vaults. The login tokens of such a remote session hold the server's device identity, so the server keeps them: DELETE returns no cache files, and the HTTP session headers and track.data lose their secret-looking keys, as for a server login.

The server vault in a session your device licenses

With the server_vault grant (or server_cdm) on the API key, a remote session that your own device licenses still takes content keys from the server vault. The server tries the vault first. A track that no server vault holds goes back to your device. See server_vault.

Remote session lifecycle and expiry¶

Remote sessions live in an in-memory store on the server and expire on a timer. You generally never touch this directly, but it explains behaviour you might observe.

Behavior	Value	Notes
Idle session TTL	300s (5 min) default	Refreshed on every request to the session and when a `titles` or `tracks` request ends. A remote session does not expire while a request works on it
Max concurrent sessions	100 default	Oldest (least recently used) is evicted when full. A remote session that a request works on goes last
Auth/input timeout	600s (10 min)	Sessions still authenticating or awaiting a prompt use this longer window instead of the TTL
Cleanup sweep	every 60s	Expired sessions are removed and their input prompts cancelled

Auth is never rushed

A remote session that is still authenticating or waiting on pending_input is not subject to the short 300s TTL. It gets the full 600s auth window. This gives you time to enter an interactive code without the remote session vanishing mid-prompt.

The TTL and max-session limits are read from server config:

unshackle.yaml (server)

serve:
  session_ttl: 300     # seconds a session may sit idle
  max_sessions: 100    # cap on concurrent sessions

Security properties worth knowing¶

API key required. Every remote session request carries X-Secret-Key. The server rejects requests without a valid API key (health check aside). See Authentication.
IP binding. A remote session records the creator's IP when the server makes it. If a later request for the same remote session comes from a different IP, the server returns 403 FORBIDDEN. Remote sessions are not portable between hosts.
Namespaced, isolated cache. Each remote session gets its own cache directory, namespaced by a hash of the API key and the remote session ID, so remote sessions cannot read each other's cached tokens. The server deletes the directory when the remote session ends. A remote session that uses a server account (serve.server_accounts) gets a persistent per-account cache instead, so the account's tokens outlive the remote session.
The server redacts secrets in logs. It redacts remote session IDs, service tags, and other user values before it writes them to the log.

Developer reference¶

This section is for developers

The material below documents the server-side implementation and the HTTP contract. End users configuring a client can stop at the sections above.

Remote session endpoints¶

The server mounts all these routes, even in --remote-only mode. Paths use the session_id that create returns.

Why --remote-only exists

--remote-only narrows the server to only the health, services, search, and remote session subset (and emits CORS headers), precisely so it is safe to sit behind Cloudflare or serve cross-origin browser clients. That trimmed surface, rather than the full --api-only mode, is what makes a CORS/Cloudflare-fronted deployment practical: reach for it when the server is public-facing or accessed from a browser origin, not when you want only the local HTTP API.

Method	Path	Purpose
`POST`	`/api/session/create`	Build + authenticate a service instance; returns a session ID immediately
`GET`	`/api/session/{id}/titles`	Fetch and cache the title list
`POST`	`/api/session/{id}/tracks`	Resolve tracks, manifests, chapters, headers/cookies for a title
`POST`	`/api/session/{id}/segments`	Resolve per-segment/track download descriptors
`POST`	`/api/session/{id}/segment_filter`	Unwanted HLS segment URIs for one track (ads, bumpers)
`POST`	`/api/session/{id}/samples`	Decrypt the cbcs samples of a track the service decrypts itself
`POST`	`/api/session/{id}/license`	DRM licensing (proxy or server CDM)
`POST`	`/api/session/{id}/keys/bad`	Report a server-vault content key that did not decrypt
`GET`	`/api/session/{id}/logs`	Drain the service's server-side log output
`GET`	`/api/session/{id}/prompt`	Poll interactive auth status / pending prompt
`POST`	`/api/session/{id}/prompt`	Submit an answer to a pending prompt
`GET`	`/api/session/{id}`	Session info (validity, TTL, counts)
`DELETE`	`/api/session/{id}`	Close the remote session, return updated cache, clean up

Create: request and response¶

POST /api/session/create requires service and title_id. It also accepts credentials, cookies (base64 of zlib-compressed Netscape cookie file), proxy, no_proxy, profile, cache (a map of filename → base64(zlib(bytes))), client_region, server_cdm (false when the user picked the local CDM), cdm_type, cdm_security_level, cdm_relay (true when the client answers CDM calls), cdm_system_id and cdm_device_type (Widevine only), service_config (the identity config keys the service lists in client_config), client (a freeform identity object the dashboard shows as sent), and the track-selection hints range_, vcodec, quality, best_available, plus arbitrary service CLI options (additionalProperties: true).

dl_params holds the dl track selection: lang, v_lang and a_lang (arrays of language strings), acodec (an array of audio codec names, such as EC3), and forced_subs and exact_lang (booleans). The server gives these values to the service in ctx.parent.params, never as service options, so a service option with the same name, such as an own --lang, does not get them. The server uses the dl default for each absent or malformed value: lang is ["orig"], v_lang, a_lang and acodec are [], and forced_subs and exact_lang are false. The server drops an unknown codec name. An empty array is a valid value and stays empty.

The server does not forward the dl mode flags: video_only, audio_only, subs_only, chapters_only, list_, skip_dl, sub_format, no_attachments, audio_description, audio_description_only and forced_subs_only. A service that reads one of them to skip work fetches more on the server, but the result is the same.

In a client-login session (not a server account), the server gives the service the client's profile in ctx.parent.params, the same as a local run with that profile. The profile name keys the service's token cache, so the cache files the client sends and gets back belong to that profile. A service can also use the name to select per-profile entries in the server's service config, such as a per-profile ESN.

The response returns before authentication finishes:

{ "session_id": "...uuid4...", "service": "EXAMPLE", "status": "authenticating",
  "server_cdm": false, "server_cdm_max_height": null, "server_vault": true, "server_device": false }

server_vault tells the client that the server vault serves a remote session its own device licenses. server_device tells it that the service runs on the server's device, so every content key comes from a vault.

Authentication runs on a background thread (asyncio.to_thread(authenticate, ...)). The remote session starts in AUTHENTICATING. The client must poll the prompt endpoint until it reaches authenticated (or failed).

Interactive auth: the `InputBridge`¶

When the service calls its input function during authenticate() on the server thread, an InputBridge pauses that thread and exposes the prompt to the HTTP layer.

AuthStatus values: authenticating, pending_input, authenticated, failed.
InputBridge.request_input(prompt, timeout=600) blocks the sync auth thread on a threading.Event until submit_response() or cancel() fires.
A timeout raises TimeoutError and marks the remote session FAILED.
A prompt after authentication (in get_titles(), get_tracks() or licensing) raises RuntimeError at once. The client polls for prompts only during authentication, so no answer can come.
A CDM call (InputBridge.request_cdm) works during and after authentication, because the client also polls while its own requests run. A call that no client fetches within 10 seconds fails then, because no client is listening. A fetched call waits 60 seconds for its answer. The call leaves the auth status as it was. An answer never marks the remote session as client-authenticated.
AUTH_INPUT_TIMEOUT = 600.0 seconds. This is also the TTL granted to AUTHENTICATING / PENDING_INPUT sessions in the store.

GET /api/session/{id}/prompt returns one of:

{ "status": "authenticated" }
{ "status": "authenticating" }
{ "status": "pending_input", "prompt": "Enter code: " }
{ "status": "pending_input", "prompt": "...", "cdm_call": { "op": "challenge", "drm": "widevine", "init_data": "...", "license_type": "OFFLINE", "privacy_mode": true, "service_certificate": "..." } }
{ "status": "failed", "error": "...message..." }

A cdm_call comes first, in any auth state. The client answers it with a JSON object in response: {"session": "...", "challenge": "<base64>"} for challenge, {"keys": [{"kid", "type", "key", "permissions"}]} for keys, {} for close, or {"error": "..."} when its CDM refuses. An older client refuses close, and the server ignores that refusal. An answered call stops being pending at once, so a client that polls again straight away does not see it twice.

A missing remote session returns 404 SESSION_NOT_FOUND. An IP mismatch returns 403 FORBIDDEN. POST /api/session/{id}/prompt takes { "response": "..." } and returns { "status": "accepted" }. A post with no pending prompt is an INVALID_INPUT error.

`SessionStore` internals¶

Source: unshackle/core/api/session_store.py. A singleton you get from get_session_store().

Config-driven limits. serve.session_ttl (default 300) and serve.max_sessions (default 100) are read as properties, so config changes take effect without recreating the store.
create() evicts the least-recently-accessed remote session when at capacity, then stores a new SessionEntry. It defaults auth_status to AUTHENTICATED, and the create handler overrides it to AUTHENTICATING.
get() refreshes last_accessed through touch(). It returns None (and deletes the entry) if an authenticated remote session has been idle longer than the TTL. Remote sessions in AUTHENTICATING / PENDING_INPUT are exempt from TTL expiry.
cleanup_expired() runs every 60s: authenticated remote sessions expire at ttl, in-flight-auth remote sessions expire at AUTH_INPUT_TIMEOUT. The removal of a remote session cancels its InputBridge and deletes its cache directory (pruning empty parent dirs up to, but not including, the cache root).
The server calls cancel_all_bridges() on shutdown, to unblock any waiting auth threads.

SessionEntry fields:

Field	Description
`session_id`	UUID4 string
`service_tag`	Normalized service tag
`service_instance`	The authenticated service object kept alive between calls
`titles` / `title_map`	Result of `get_titles()` and a `title_id → Title` map
`tracks` / `tracks_by_title` / `chapters_by_title`	Cached resolved tracks and chapters
`creator_ip`	IP recorded at create time for IP-binding checks
`cache_tag`	Per-session cache directory tag
`input_bridge`	`InputBridge` for interactive auth, if any
`auth_status` / `auth_error`	Current `AuthStatus` and last error message
`created_at` / `last_accessed`	Timestamps; `last_accessed` drives TTL and LRU eviction

Per-session cache namespacing¶

The create handler builds a Cacher namespaced as:

_sessions/<pbkdf2_hmac(sha256, X-Secret-Key, "unshackle-session-ns", 100000)[:12]>/<session_id>/<service>

The handler writes forwarded cache files into that directory before authentication. On DELETE, when the login belongs to the client (client_auth) and the remote session does not run on the server's device, the handler harvests updated cache files from the whole directory tree (compressing each with zlib and base64-encoding, excluding titles_* files) and returns them under a cache field, so the client can keep refreshed tokens. Each cache key is the file path relative to that directory, with / separators and no .json suffix, which is the Cacher cache key the service reads it with:

{
  "status": "ok",
  "cache": {
    "tokens": "...base64(zlib(bytes))...",
    "session_web/<sha1>": "...base64(zlib(bytes))..."
  }
}

Both sides reject a cache key with a drive letter, a root, a .. segment, an empty segment, or more than 8 segments before it becomes a path, so a peer cannot write outside the cache directory. Both sides also refuse a cache map with more than 64 entries. The server skips a cache key it cannot write, such as one that names an existing file as a directory, and logs a warning.

Remote session info response¶

GET /api/session/{id}:

{
  "session_id": "...",
  "service": "EXAMPLE",
  "valid": true,
  "expires_in": 300,
  "track_count": 12,
  "title_count": 40
}

expires_in is the configured TTL, not time remaining

The expires_in value reports the store's configured session_ttl, not the seconds left before this specific remote session expires.

Reference client: `RemoteService`¶

Source: unshackle/core/remote_service.py. This is the canonical consumer of the remote session API and a good template for any client.

RemoteClient.request sets X-Secret-Key and User-Agent: unshackle/<version>, uses the server's timeout from remote_services (default 120s) as the read timeout, and treats any status_code >= 400 as fatal: it logs Server error [<error_code>]: <message> and raises SystemExit(1). A 200 body with "status": "error" is also fatal (see the heartbeat below).
Heartbeat. The titles, tracks and license routes send a newline every 30s while the service works. The read timeout starts again at each byte, so a slow request stays open for as long as the server works on it, and a reverse proxy does not close it as idle. A route that answers within 30s sends the usual response. After 30s the status is already 200, so a failure after that time arrives as the usual error body with status 200. Your client must check status in the body. JSON parsers ignore the leading newlines. The server does not gzip-compress a heartbeat response, because gzip output cannot start before the body is ready.
Retries. The download-side HTTP session mounts an adapter with Retry(total=5, backoff_factor=0.2, status_forcelist=[429, 500, 502, 503, 504]).
Flow. authenticate() → create (+ poll prompt every 2s up to a 600s deadline, answering pending_input prompts. With stdin closed the client logs an error and raises SystemExit(1) instead of posting an empty answer) → get_titles() → get_tracks() (merging returned session_headers/session_cookies, re-parsing manifests) → get the licence in proxy mode or server_cdm mode → close() (DELETE, saving any returned cache).
Server resolution. resolve_server() reads config.remote_services.<name> into {url, api_key, services, server_cdm}, injecting the server_cdm flag into the services map as _server_cdm.

Troubleshooting¶

\"Could not connect to remote server ... Is it running?\"

The client could not reach the URL. Make sure that unshackle serve operates on the server, the url/port in remote_services are correct (default port 8786), and any firewall or reverse proxy allows the connection.

403 FORBIDDEN mid-download

The request came from a different IP than the one that made the remote session. Remote sessions are IP-bound. Do not move between networks (or NAT egress IPs) during a remote download.

Auth times out or the prompt never resolves

Interactive auth allows up to 600s. If you miss that window, the server marks the remote session failed and cleans it up. Operate the download again. If the server never prompts you, make sure that the credentials and cookies the client forwarded are valid for the service.

\"Multiple remote services configured. Use --server ...\"

You have more than one entry under remote_services. Pass --server <name> to pick one.